Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (Mahmood Mamdani) [2004]

good muslimÅterkommer med ordentlig recension efter att jag läst om den. Mycket givande bok – med givna blinda fläckar.


Våld historiskt:

The unification of Spain began with an act of ethnic cleansing: 1492 was also the year Ferdinand and Isabella signed the Edict of Expulsion, designed to rid Spain of its Jews… seventy thousand Spanish Jews converted to Christianity and remained in Spain, only to be plagued by the Inquisition… Of the remaining 130,000, an estimated 50,000 fled to the North African and Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire – where they were warmly welcomed – and about 80,000 crossed the border into Portugal… In 1499, seven years after the Edict of Expulsion, the Spanish state gave its Muslims the same choice: convert or leave.

Citerar Lindqvists Aoch GWB: de flesta goda muslimer vill ta avstånd från dåliga muslimer:

But this could not be hide the central message of such discourse: unless proved to be ”good,” every Muslim was presumed to be ”bad.” All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining in a war against ”bad Muslims.”

”Culture talk”:

…whereas Africa is seen as incapable of modernity, hard-core Islam is seen not only incapable but also resistant to modernity. Whereas Africans are said to victimize themselves, hard-core Muslims are said to be prone to taking others along to the world beyond. No longer just another earthly enemy, the Crusades demonized the Muslim as evil incarnate, ”the personification of the very religion of the Antichrist.” This is why the point of the Crusades was not to convert Muslims but to exterminate them… Edward Said summed up ”the principal dogmas of Orientalism” in his majesterial study of the same name. The first dogma is that the same Orientalist histories that portray “the West” as “rational, developed, humane [and] superior,” caricature “the Orient” as “aberrant, undeveloped [and] inferior.” Another dogma is that “the Orient” lives according to set rules inscribed in sacred texts, not in response to the changing demands of life. The third dogma prescribes “that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and scientifically ‘objective.’” And the final dogma is “that the Orient is at the bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).” In its North African colonies, France drew a legal distinction between “Berber” and ‘Arab.” By governing “Berbers” with a “customary law” (dahir) and ‘Arabs” with a religious law, they turned “Berber” and ‘Arab” into mutually exclusive identities, first legal, then political. The nationalist response was in reality a backlash that reified the identity ‘Arab,” so much so that simply “to acknowledge any distinction between Arabs and Berbers was to risk associating oneself with the French colonial attempt to divide the nation into ethnic enclaves.” […] Not surprisingly, who is a Berber and who is not—and what percent of Morocco’s population is Berber today—is now a profoundly political question.

konservativ religion kom i två vågor i modern tid (USA): >ww2 och >Roe vs Wade (fastslog kvinnans rätt till fri abort)

As early as the mid-1970s, George Gallup, Jr., had polled Americans about their religious views and found that more than one third – that is, more than fifty million adult Americans – described themselves as ”born again,” defined as having experienced ”a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Jesus Christ.” Jimmy Carter was America’s first ”born-again” president. Ronald Reagan was the second, and George W. Bush is the third.

…only four widespread uses of jihad as a mobilizing slogan – until the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. [Nämligen: 1. den kurdiske krigaren Saladin mot det första korståget på 1000-talet 2. ”Senegambia” på 1600-talet, militant islam fungerade då som motkraft (ledd av Sufi-ledare) mot den transatlantiska slavhandeln 3. Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1700-tal); wahhabisternas krig mot ottomaner och shi-iter, ivrigt påhejad av Storbritannien 4. Sudan i slutet av 1800-talet, där ledaren Muhammad Ahmed presenterade sig som al-Mahdi och man krigade mot den turk-egyptiske administrationen som alltmer ”absorberades i ett expanderande brittiskt imperium”. ”Al Mahdi was spectacularly successful as the organizer of the revolt. Armed with no more than spears and swords, the Mahdists… won battle after battle, in 1885 reaching the capital, Khartoum, where they killed Charles Gordon, the British general and hero of the second Opium War with China (1856-1860)… But once the victorious al-Mahdi moved to unite different regions and create a united Sudan under a single rule, the anticolonial coalition disintegrated into warring factions in the north… the population of Sudan fell from around 7 million before the Mahdist revolt to somewhere between 2 and 3 million after the fall of the Mahdist state in 1898. pratar teoretiskt om vilka institutioner Khomeini inrättade ijtihad = ”institutionalized practice of interpreting the sharia to take into account changing historical circumstances… It makes for a substantive body of law constantly changing in response to changing conditions. The attitude toward ijtihad is the single most important issue that divides society-centered from state-centered – and progressive from reactionary – Islamists… My argument is that the theoretical roots of Islamist political terror lie in the state-centered, not the society-centered, movement.

…the focal point of the Cold War shifted from Southeast Asia to southern Africa.

Financing proxy waRS: There has been a long-established link between the drug trade – whether licit or illicit – and the financing of colonial wars.

The CIA entered into two sets of alliances it considered key to waging the Cold War, both of which boosted the drug trade far beyond prewar levels. The first was with the Mafia in Italy and France, the second was with anti-Communist Chinese forces along the Burma-China border. From 1948 to 1950, the CIA allied ”with the Corsican underworld in its struggle against the French Communist Party for control over the strategic Mediterranean port of Marseille.” [Om Laos:] The Hmong’s main cash crop was opium, and the CIA readily turned the other way as the Hmong commander, General Vang Pao, used a Corsican charter to export his crop to distant markets. In 1965, when the escalating air war and the political infighting in the Laotian elite ”forced the small Corsican charter airlines out of the opium business,” General Pao was able ”to use the CIA’s Air America to collect opium from his scattered high-land villages” for delivery to Long Tieng and Vientiane… In 1967, the CIA and USAID bought two C-47 planes for General Pao, who then opened his own air-transport company, which he called Xeng Khouang Air and everyone else called Air Opium… began to supplyit to the growing concentration of U.S. troops in Vietnam, the CIA still looked the other way. That Pao was becoming a world-class player in the heroin market became evident on April 25, 1971, when French custom officials opened a suitcase belonging to the newly arrived Laotian ambassador in Paris, Prince Sopsaisana, and found it contained sixty kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin, worth $13,5 million on the streets. It was ”one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.” [Proxy-strategin tillämpades senare på nedanstående afrikanska länder:] …also modeled on an earlier American experience on the African continent, in the Congo, on the eve of African independence in the early sixties. Determined to prevent the ascent of militant nationalism in Africa’s prize resource-rich country, Washington did not hesitate to put together a mercenary force of mainly South African and Rhodesian whites. [Senare, om Angola:] … a renewed attempt to use mercenaries did not work. With hardly an ally in a region impatient to decolonize, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – speaking for the United States – encouraged apartheid South Africa to intervene. The result was the Angolan debacle.

[Kongo självständigt 1960, två veckor senare bryter sig en Belgien-stödd fraktion (Katanga) loss, Eisenhowers administration ser med oro på den nationalistiske premiärministern Patrice Lumumba (”en afrikansk Castro”), som hade fått militärt stöd från Sovjet. CIA fick ansvaret att eliminera honom => standard-protokollet: militärkupp i december 1960 och avrättning av Lumumba- under direkt översyn av belgiska officerer – i januari 1961. Officeren Joseph Mobutu, en av CIA:s tillgångar, tog över makten, välkomnades av Kennedy under ett besök tillVita Huset för att ha räddat Kongo från kommunisterna. Rebeller (”lumumbister”; kända som ‘the Simba’ då de endast hade ”bågar, pilar och cykelkedjor” somvapen) fortsatte kämpa, utan tecken på fortsatt sovjetiskt stöd, CIA å andra sidan, skickade sina exilkubaner, etc. The Simbas tog över Stanleyville, Kongos tredje största stad, och den reguljära armén kollapsade (!). Amerikanska ambassaden skickade ett telegram till Kongos regering: a) sök hjälp från Belgien (militär intervention) b) rekrytera vita legoknektar c) be om amerikansk militär hjälp. Belgien och Frankrike menade att rebellerna gick att förhandla med (för att skydda deras värdefulla investeringar); då de inte stod under sovjetisk kontroll. Således: legoknektar (majoriteten vita sydafrikaner), som Washington och Belgien skulle avlöna, men Washington stod för deras transportkostnader.] When they met resistance, the mercenaries called on the Congolese air force, which did not include a single Congolese but several T-28s and B-26s supplied by the United States and flown by Cuban exiles, as well as a squadron of seven T-6s from Italy, piloted by South African and European mercenaries… The rebels had neither planes nor antiaircraft guns… The Simba responded by taking American and Belgian hostages, the majority in Stanleyville, now the rebel capital, and the mercenaries and their apologists in turn cited this as justification for their own intervention. [Och enligt standardprotokollet är legoknektarna fullständigt barbariska, vilket Mamdani berättar, beskrivs i t.ex. brittiska tidningar (The Observer) men ytterst sällan i amerikansk media. Mobutu tog slutligen makten över landet i slutet av 1965, legoknektarna fasades ut – en del av dem vägrade, gjorde uppror och splittrades i faktioner som krävde nya leveranser av legoknektar för att stävjas. Det hela försvårades av att Mobutu ville ha dessa rebelliska legoknektar inför rätta, vilket skulle ha dragit till sig massor av oönskad uppmärksamhet. Det är inte lätt att vara imperialist!] [Det föll på den icke-valda Fords bord att ta hand om det ”rapidly disintegrating Portugese empire”, och man var sedan innan fast besluten om att förhindra MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) från att få makten, ffa genom att stötta Mobutu-stödda FNLA (The Front for National Liberation of Angola) och Unita (The Union for the Total Independence of Angola), med band till Sydafrika. MPLA stöddes av Kuba materiellt, utbildningsmässigt, men ännu utan nämnvärd militär närvaro. Men detta proxy-krig gick betydligt knackigare än Kongo, skriver Mamdani: Unita och FNLA började strida mot varandra och det var inte lätt att skramla ihop legoknektar denna gång, och Kissinger nödgades be Sydafrika om en regelrätt invasion (obs att detta är 1975 – ”Vietnamspöket” är i högsta grad ännu levande, tack så mycket Bush Sr.), vilken de inledde i oktober. Mamdani skriver att ”många menar” att USA och Sovjet kom överens: tillbakadragande av Sydafrika mot att affärsintressena i Angola lämnades ifred (t.ex. monopolägande diamantproducenten CFB, som fortsatte sin verksamhet genom kriget). FN:s säkerhetsråd slog fast att Sydafrika var den skyldige och dömdes därmed till att betala skadestånd. Ännu viktigare, led militären en stor prestigeförlust mot kubanerna, vilket enligt Mamdani inte ska underskattas när det gäller antiapartheid-kampen, t.ex. barn-upproren i Soweto några månader efter Sydafrikas officiella reträtt (deras ”Grisbukten”). För USA:s del ledde Angola till Clark Amendment 1976: förbud mot sponsring av militära/paramilitära grupper, minskade Pentagon och CIA:s officiella befogenheter för paramilitär verksamhet, band presidenten att gå via kongressen inför större reguljära militära uppdrag, etc. Unitas ledare, Jonas Savimbi: ”A great country like the United States has other channels… [T]he Clark Amendment means nothing.” Clark Amendment återkallades 1985.] Safari Club: underrättelsetjänsterna i Egypten, Frankrike, Iran, Marocko och Saudiarabien (informellt USA) startar samarbete under denna paroll 1976, med fokus på Afrika som Kalla krigets nya slagfält. Slog ner ett uppror i Katanga (utbrytarstaten) 1977. [Detta förklaras inte i detalj: efter etiopiska revolutionen 1974 såg Siad Barre – en Sovjet-allierad – sin chans att förverkliga den pan-somaliska drömmen och invaderade Ogaden (officiellt Etiopien, etniskt Somalia?), varpå Sovjet plötsligt (varför?) byter sida, och med en stor kubansk militär insats slår tillbaka Barres trupper, varvid Safari Club erbjuder honom sin vänskap för att bli av med ryssarna.] Renamo: Africa’s first genuine terrorist movement [Motsvarigheten till Unita i Mozambique, skapat av Rhodesia (idag Zimbabwe) på 70-talet. T. sk. fr. Unita ingen politisk bas. Som sagt: standardprotokoll: fullständig barbari, utbredd användning av landminor, >330 000 civila döda i inbördeskriget. Mamdani pratar också om en ideologisk förändring iom Reagan: constructive engagement (totalitära/fascistiska diktaturer kunde reformeras med vårt goda inflytande) och dessutom rollback, snarare än containment (vilket innebär en aggressivare inställning till etablerade ”vänsterregeringar” – tidigare Sovjets domän, men man såg väl sin chans med sino-sovjetiska splittringen, etc. Intressant är att Mamdani menar att man lärde sig efter antikrigsrörelsen att besitta ”den högre moraliska positionen”; således blev kampen inte bara anti-kommunism (domino-teorin) utan Mujaheddin och contras var frihetskämpar som Jefferson et al, osv. OBS att denna moraliska rappakalja sammanföll med ”återfödelse-teorin”; kristendomens uppsväng – många höger-kristna organisationer samlade in donationer till contras m.fl.).] [Nicaragua: FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Forces), ledda av Anastasio Somoza, ingick i en koalition av anti-Sandinista-grupper i Florida och Centralamerika, som gemensamt kallades contras. Clark Amendment var tillintetgjord, en utspädd version (Boland Amendment) skapade ändå problem och man fick hitta mindre officiella kanaler för att stödja contras; droghandeln, Israel, vapenförsäljning till Iran och Irak, etc.]

”Israel sold Somoza 98% of the weapons he used against the Nicaraguan population” between September 1978 and his ouster the following July.

[Citerar Sharon, när denne försvarar vapenförsäljningen till Iran 1982 med att Irak är Israels fiende och att man hoppas på återupprättande av lika goda diplomatiska förhållanden med Iran (!).

No one – including the CIA – really expected the contras to win the war against the Sandinistas. The point of this war, this terror, was not to win but to bleed the government, to show it as incapable of protecting the population from terror and simultaneously to invite its repression – two different but effective ways of discrediting the government.

The United States’ embrace of terror can be plotted as a learning curve that went through three successive phases of the late Cold War, from southern Africa to Central America and Central Asia. [Närmar sig fundamentalistisk Islam:]

Thus, the United States supported the Sarekat-i-Islam against Sukarno in Indonesia, the Jamaat-i-Islami against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, and the Society of Muslim Brothers against Nasser in Egypt… I cite these instances not to tarnish and discredit the movements concerned because they were supported by American or Israeli intelligence, but to show the unintended consequences of misinformed, cynical and opportunistic actions can boomberang on their perpetrators. [S.k. ‘blowback’.] The first student occupation of the embassy occurred shortly after Khomeini’s return to Iran on February 14, 1979, but Khomeini and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan moved quickly to expel the occupiers. Eight months later, circumstances changed radically: when the U.S. government welcomed the deposed shah to New York for medical treatment, Khomeini responded with criticism of the United States as ”the Great Satan.” [Inte precis konstruktiv kritik…] After the release of women and black Marine guards, the remaining fifty-two American diplomats were held for 444 days. Brzezinski: …after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec, 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was 3 July 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention. [Invasionen ledde som bekant till oväntad finansiell kärlek mellan USA och general Zias Pakistan.] The redefined war was taken over by CIA chief William Casey, who undertook three significant measures in 1986. The first was to convince Congress to step up American involvement by providing the mujahideen with American advisers and American-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. The second was to expand the Islamic guerilla war from Afghanistan into the Soviet republics of Tajikisan and Uzbekistan, a decision reversed when the Soviet Union threatened to attack Pakistan in retaliation. The third was to step up the recruitment of radical Islamists from around the world to come train in Pakistan and fight alongside the mujahideen. The CIA looked for a Saudi Prince to lead this crusade but was unable to find one. It settled for the next best… Bin Laden was recruited, with U.S. approval at the highest level, by Prince Turki al-Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence… The parting of the ways was the result of disagreement in 1989 over the future of the jihad: bin Laden ”envisioned an all-Arab legion, which eventually could be used to wage jihad in Saudi Arabia and Egypt,” whereas Azzam ”strongly opposed making war against fellow-Muslims.” Soon after, Azzam and two of his sons were blown up by a car bomb as they were driving to a mosque in Peshawar. A meeting was held toward the end of 1989… a new organization was created in that meeting to wage jihad beyond the borders of Afghanistan. That organization was al-Qaeda, ”the Base.” [Kabuls kommunistiska regering faller i april 1992. I marginalen har jag skrivit ”Read more. More. Mooooore!”, vilket fortfarande gäller.] The real damage the CIA did was not the providing of arms and money but the privatization of information about how to produce and spread violence – the formation of private militias – capable of creating terror… The team of Los Angeles Times reporters who carried out an investigation into the aftermath of the Afghan War ”over four continents” found that the key leaders of every major terrorist attack, from New York to France to Saudi Arabia, inevitably turned out to have been veterans of the Afghan War. Prior to the Afghan jihad, there was no local production of heroin in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The production there was of opium, a very different drug, which was directed to small, rural, regional markets. By the end of the Afghan jihad, the picture had changed drastically: the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world’s leading producers of both opium and processed heroin, the source of ”75 percent of the world’s opium…” … the United Nations International Drug Control Program traced the rapid expansion of Afghan opium production to exactly 1979… [the UNICDP] estimated that the actual heroin-addicted population had gone from negligible in 1979 to 1,3 million by 1985, ”a much steeper rise than in any [other] nation.” [Motsättningar inom mujahedin: nord-syd, sunni-shia, farsi-pashtun (språk + etnicitet) -> centraliserad regering ovanpå detta. Än viktigare: moderata muslimska ledare negligerades: man ville ha militanta, anti-kommunistiska råskinn – ofta utan politisk bas. Således behövde man hitta varenda bindgalen idiot i varje avkrok, och så länge kriget enade dem och såg till att de fick ”bistånd” fungerade det någorlunda, men så fort Sovjet drog sig ur föll landet i inbördeskrig.] talib was a student in a religious school, and the movement of students, Taliban, was born of warfare stretching across the decades, of children born in cross-border refugee camps, of male orphans with no camaraderie but those of other boys in madrassahs, which initially provided student recruits to defend the population at large – ironically, women and young boys in particular – from the lust and the looting of mujahideen guerrillas. Without understanding that the Taliban provided the population effective protection against the likes of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, warlords turned drug lords, it is difficult to understand why the population turned to the Taliban. [Algeriet: i de första valen 1991 gick islamister med erfarenhet från kriget i Afghanistan mot majoritetsseger, varpå armén ogiltigförklarade valen och tog makten.] The founding of Hizbullah was a direct reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the subsequent introduction of western troops under the banner of the Multi-National Forces (MNF). Iran responded to this by dispatching fifteen hundred Revolutionary Guards to the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley. [Försvarsorganisation initialt, liksom Taliban.] From Proxy War to Open Aggression Two forms of nationalism, one secular and the other religious, they represented the more successful attempts at state building in the region. Washington’s support of Baghdad in the war was an indication of which it thought was the greater danger. But Washington’s real strategic objective was to bleed both to death. [De ekonomiska sanktionerna motiverades initialt med att Irak skulle retirera från Kuwait, sedan avrustning.] …Canada and Braxil, pushed through a resolution in 1998 mandating the UN to assess humanitarian conditions in Iraq. The result was the 1999 UNICEF demographic survey, which for the first time brought to light comprehensive and credible evidence of the human tragedy wrought by the sanctions regime. [Citerar Richard Garfield, professor i ”clinical international nursing at Columbia University”:]

…the only instance of a sustained, large increase in mortality in a stable population of more than 2 million in the last two hundred years.

[USA lade veto på en sändning med vaccin, värt 280 miljoner, med motiveringen att eftersom det var levande (attenuerade) vaccin, kunde Irak potentiellt extrahera mikroberna ur dessa…] Nazis var de första att använda utarmat uran (sant?) The defining feature of modern Western imperialism–particularly British and French–was the claim that expanding domains were key to spreading the rule of law internationally. Even the most brutal of dictatorships that were self-consciously western, such as Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, insisted that they were upholders of the rule of law. From this perspective, the George W. Bush administration’s open disdain for the rule of law is unmatched in the history of Western imperialism. [ICC inrättades som en sista instans när länder inte ville driva rättsmål mot massmördare, etc. Washington bad först alla amerikanska medborgare att få immunitet, men när det inte gick hem upprättade man bilaterala avtal med ett fyrtiotal länder där man lovar att inte utlämna varandras medborgare (däribland Indien, Egypten, Israel, Filippinerna).] To the extent that ”culture” becomes a code word for describing certain peoples by ascribing to them a set of unchanging attributes, it functions as a latterday counterpart of race talk. Unlike the criminal, the political terrorist is not easily deterred by punishment… America’s bombing campaign in Afghanistan is more likely to be remembered as a combination of blood revenge and medieval-type exorcism than a search for a solution to terrorism. Tes: lagar (ffa Clark) ==> paramilitärt stöd, terrorgrupper osv –> blowback

A key lesson of the Vietnam War is that the antiwar and anti-imperialist movement inside the United States restrained American military power from being fully unleashed on the people of Vietnam. [What was left to unleash except atomic weaponry?]

Who can forget that apartheid South Africa claimed to be ”the only democracy in Africa,” just as Israel today claims to be ”the only democracy in the Middle East”?

Out of a population of roughly 20 million, 1 million died, another million and a half were maimed, another 5 million became refugees, and just about everyone was internally-displaced. UN agencies estimate that nearly a million and a half went clinically insane as a consequence of decades of continuous war. Those who survived lived in the most mined country in the world. Afghanistan was a brutalized society even before the American bombing began.

Worse still, if the struggle against political enemies is defined as a struggle against evil, it will turn into a holy war. And in holy war, there can be no compromise. Evil cannot be converted; it must be eliminated.

återkommer till ijtihad = vattendelaren mellan demokrati/odemokratisk islamism Iran ?? Kom igen!


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